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QUALITY COST AND FAILURE RISK IN THE CHOICE OF SINGLE VERSUS MULTIPLE SOURCING  
1. Introduction  
This paper examines the supply base composition problem, in particular the choice of single versus 
multiple sourcing, from a quality cost control perspective. There have been over twenty years of interest in 
understanding the relative advantages of single versus multiple sourcing, beginning with Deming (1986) 
and Porter (1985). Many issues have been considered in the literature regarding selecting suppliers to form 
a supply base. For example, Weber, Current, and Benton (1991) have identified more than twenty criteria 
for supplier selection decisions. Among the many factors considered, three of them, namely price, delivery, 
and quality, are often regarded as the core to consider (Lemke et al. 2000). The emphasis of this paper is on 
the last, but not the least, of these major factors: quality. 
A strand of the literature on multiple sourcing has focused on the advantage of price reduction due 
to more suppliers competing with each other (the competition advantage).1 A second, more recent strand 
examines the advantage arising from the protection against supplier failures (the protection advantage).2 
The supplier failures that have been studied are a variety of unreliable supply such as late/insufficient/no 
delivery due to reasons like machine breakdowns, labor strikes, natural disasters, and financial defaults 
(e.g., Babich, Burnetas, and Ritchken 2007, Burke, Carrillo, and Vakharia 2007, Dada, Petruzzi, and 
Schwarz 2007, Federgruen and Yang 2008, 2009). Such failures adversely affect the buying company’s 
production and may result in the loss of sale in the end product market. In contrast, the supplier failure 
studied here is about undependable (or even unsafe) products sold to the customers of the buying 
company, as a result of using product parts with latent defects provided by its suppliers. 
I emphasize the difference between unreliable supply and undependable products. The former is 
caused by random yields, which have been studied extensively (see reviews by Yano and Lee 1995 and 
Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak 2004). The latter is due to latent defects, which is receiving growing attention 
                                                   
1 Studies in this strand often use modeling techniques of the auction literature (e.g., Tunca and Wu 2009). See Mishra and 
Tadikamalla (2006) for a concise review of major results of the models in this strand. 
2 Examples in this strand are Berger, Gerstenfeld, and Zeng (2004), Berger and Zeng (2006), and Ruiz-Torres and 
Mahmoodi (2006, 2007). These studies rely mainly on numerical simulation analyses to obtain results, in contrast to the 
analytical modeling method used in this paper. 
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(e.g., Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan 2009). Latent defects are flaws or weaknesses in product items that 
could not be discovered by reasonable inspection prior to the sale. They later manifest as field failures in 
the hands of end customers. Consequences to the buying company (i.e., the manufacturer/retailer to which 
the supplier has sold the faulty items) are all sorts of quality costs. They include costs due to warranty 
repairs, product recalls, defect liability claims, reputation damage, loss of sale, and customer confidence 
restoration efforts (Nagar and Rajan 2001). Such costs originating from latent defects can be huge. For 
instance, in 2002, Ford announced that it would spend $3 billion to replace millions of Firestone tires 
causing customer safety concerns. 
If latent defects are due to occasional independent mistakes, the impact probably is limited. Latent 
defects, however, can result from design flaws, systematic manufacturing faults, or the like. In that case, 
defects can occur in a correlated manner in product items from the same supplier.3 As a result, voluminous 
amounts of product items may be affected. Some of these items with latent defects later are identified when 
field failures occur. Depending on the nature of the product, the consequences to end customers can be 
substantial or even fatal, e.g., the 34 deaths in accidents allegedly caused by runaway Toyota vehicles 
(Shepardson 2010). It is thus crucial to understand how the risk of such failures can be diversified and the 
costs of doing so. I add to the understanding of this issue by analyzing a supply base composition model 
for the LUX (Latent defect-Undependable product-eXternal failure) setting described above.  
The question asked in this study is similar to Benjaafar, Elahi, and Donohue’s (2007). They 
examine the outsourcing of a fixed demand for a service at a fixed price to a set of potential suppliers. The 
two competition mechanisms they compare, namely the supplier-selection (SS) versus the supplier-
allocation (SA) approach, are equivalent to single versus multiple sourcing. Their analysis focuses on how 
the relative advantage of SS versus SA is affected by the presence/magnitude of demand-independent 
versus demand-dependent service costs. By contrast, the emphasis here is on the convexity of the external 
                                                   
3 An example of products with correlated latent defects is hard disk drive. It affects many aspects of modern living, from 
home electronic appliances like digital video recorders to large automation systems controlled by computers that have hard disk 
drives as massive storage devices. According to Paris and Long (2006), “[b]atch-correlated failures result from the manifestation 
of a common defect in most, if not all, disk drives belonging to the same production batch. They are much less frequent than 
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failure cost rather than the service/production cost structure. 
The buyer in my model can rank suppliers by a composite score,4 which for simplicity is 
represented by a supplier’s quality level (i.e., a parameter affecting the defect rate). Multiple sourcing 
cannot be more advantageous than single sourcing unless the expected profit maximizing buyer has a 
“risk-averse” preference. In the model, this is due to a quadratic external failure cost representing the 
reputation damage suffered by the buyer, as a result of field failures of undependable products.  
When ignoring any desire for risk diversification, the buyer would source only from the supplier of 
the highest quality because this minimizes the quality cost. However, if risk diversification is desirable, the 
buyer might want to admit another supplier into the supply base and thereby diversify the failure risk 
somewhat. Whether the buyer would continue to admit more depends on how difficult it is to maintain the 
overall quality level of the supply base. With more suppliers selected into the supply base, the buyer had to 
choose from suppliers of further lower qualities. By weighing the incremental quality cost against the 
incremental benefit from further risk diversification, the optimal supply base is determined. 
I show that the optimal supply base has the following properties. If a supplier is selected to 
constitute the supply base, any supplier of higher quality must also be selected. Moreover, larger 
production quotas should be assigned to higher-quality suppliers. These results hold under a mild condition 
on the differences among suppliers’ production costs. This includes equal costs as a special case but also 
allows unequal costs. As long as the condition is fulfilled, the suppliers’ production costs do not need to 
have any particular order (e.g., higher-quality suppliers may or may not have higher production costs). 
I also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for determining the size of the optimal supply 
base, provided the mild condition on suppliers’ production costs holds. If the question is not about 
determining the exact size but merely about whether single or multiple sourcing is optimal, alternative 
necessary and sufficient condition can be derived without requiring any precondition to hold.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
random disk failures but can cause catastrophic data losses.” Paris and Long advise that redundant copies of the same data should 
be stored on disks from different batches and, possibly, different manufacturers to reduce impact of batch- correlated failures. 
4 Firms like Magna Closures require interested companies to provide detailed information about their business operations in 
order to become certified suppliers of the firms. Only after then would the suppliers receive invitations to submit tenders for the 
firm’s procurement programs. (See, e.g., Magna Closures’ Supplier Quality Manual & Requirements at http://iweb01ds. 
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This paper contributes to the literature on multiple sourcing by analyzing its protection against 
external failure risks arising from undependable products due to latent defects. The model highlights the 
sourcing decision as one about selecting the right combination of suppliers to balance between risk 
diversification and quality cost reduction. Prior studies instead concern mainly the number of suppliers that 
determines the level of competition.  
The paper adds a new view point to the debate on single versus multiple sourcing. Deming (1986) 
argues that a buying company should take quality costs into consideration and choose single sourcing by 
selecting a high-quality supplier that minimizes total cost of sourcing. The result of this paper suggests that 
in minimizing total cost of sourcing, one might need to use multiple sourcing and include suppliers of 
lower quality. This can happen when the total cost of sourcing counts in the benefit from supplier failure 
risk diversification. The breakup of the long-term buyer-supplier relationship between Ford and Firestone 
demonstrates that sometimes it needs more than loyalty and trust to diversify the risk of latent defects. 
This paper’s closed-form characterization of the optimal supply base with “quality-driven” 
properties substantially reduces the computational complexity of finding the set of selected suppliers. The 
tractability of the model provides promising potential for using it as a building block to integrate with 
another model (e.g., Chao et al. 2009 or Arya and Mittendorf 2007) to study interesting questions. An 
example is the joint use of multiple sourcing and product recall cost sharing to reduce external failure 
risks. Another is the interplay between internal transfers and external procurement in controlling quality 
costs in a LUX setting.  
In the next section, I formulate a quality-cost model of supply base composition. The analysis of 
the model is provided in Section 3. Further discussion on the importance of analyzing such a model for the 
LUX setting is given in Section 4, where related recent studies are also reviewed. Section 5 contains 
concluding remarks, with technical proofs and derivations relegated to the appendix. Table 1 summarizes 
the notations used in the paper.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
magnaclosures.com .) 
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2. A Quality-cost Model of Supply Base Composition 
Consider a setting with a single buyer and n ≥ 2 available suppliers, indexed by i ∈ N = {1, 2, …, 
n}. All of them are expected profit maximizers. The buyer designs a product, owns the brand, and operates 
as a make-to-order manufacturer. Except for a component part (e.g., the accelerator pedal of an 
automobile), the rest of the product is manufactured by the buyer and the related designs have been used in 
previous generations of the product for a long time. It is common knowledge to all parties in this model 
that except for the component part in concern, the designs of the rest of the product are foolproof, and the 
production quality of the buyer is virtually perfect. In other words, if a product failure occurs, it must be 
due to the failure of the component part. 
The buyer plans to outsource the manufacturing of Q units of the component part to some/all of 
the suppliers. I suppose that the quantity Q > 0 is either the optimal quantity it has already figured out, or 
otherwise what follows is part of the thought process to figure out the optimal total procurement quantity 
by first finding out the minimized cost associated with a given quantity. For simplicity, I assume Q is also 
the quantity of the finished products supplied to end customers. Inventory holding issues are suppressed to 
focus on other economic forces driving the sourcing decision. 
The buyer selects some suppliers to form the supply base by offering each of the n suppliers a take-
it-or-leave-it procurement contract. The contract for supplier i specifies a production quota Qi ≥ 0 for the 
supplier and a procurement payment Ti ≥ 0 for the units supplied according to the quota. Feasibility 
requires 
n
i 1=
∑ Qi = Q. For analytical convenience, I will treat Qi like a real variable although it is assumed 
to take an integer value for ease of interpretation. The approximate solution so obtained would not be too 
far from the exact solution because in practice the production target Q is likely to be quite large and the 
number of selected suppliers tends to be small. The indivisibility of Qi should be negligible. 
Because the buyer will never offer a positive payment for nothing, contracts assigning zero quotas 
must also specify zero payments. Such contracts are called null contracts. It is analytically more convenient 
to have the buyer offering contracts to all suppliers, with some being null contracts, than offering contracts 
only to the selected suppliers. Suppliers getting null contracts are losers in the supplier competition. For 
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convenience, I suppose suppliers will always reject null contracts. In reality, the buyer may simply ignore 
the non-selected suppliers. Suppliers getting “genuine” contracts will accept them if the resulting expected 
profits are no worse than the profits that could have been earned from their best alternative opportunities. 
For simplicity, these reservation profits are assumed to be zero. 
Related economic studies suggest that scale economies in production inherently bias against 
multiple sourcing, whereas scale diseconomies bias towards it. (More precisely, the multiple sourcing 
arrangement analyzed in this paper is of the split sense. See the review of related economic studies 
provided in the appendix for a clarification of the different senses the term “multiple sourcing” might 
mean.) To eliminate such inherent biases, I assume the suppliers have constant marginal costs of 
production, ci’s, and no fixed costs.
5 The production cost incurred by supplier i to meet its assigned quota 
thus equals ciQi. For simplicity, I normalize the buyer’s fixed and marginal costs of production to zero. 
The design of the component part is newly introduced by the buyer to replace an expensive (but 
infallible) design used in the past. The new design is much more affordable than the old one and believed 
to be very robust under a wide range of operating conditions. Still, it is not infallible. Whether a field 
failure of the component part will occur depends on whether it has a latent defect. By definition, such a 
defect cannot be discovered by inspection prior to sale. In this model, it is assumed that if a latent defect 
exists in a component part, it will surely reveal itself through a field failure. The chance of having a 
defective part depends on the buyer’s design quality level, as well as the production quality of the supplier 
that manufactures the part. 
Specifically, let Di denote the amount of defective parts in the Qi units of parts produced by 
supplier i. I assume defects occur in a manner following stochastically proportional yield loss, i.e., Di = 
RiδiQi. The random variables Ri’s are independently and identically distributed with mean E(Ri) = µ, where 
0 < µ  ≤ 6µ << 1, and variance var(Ri) = σ
2 > 0. Intuitively, Riδi may be referred to as the random yield loss, 
although for convenience I sometimes use this to refer to Ri alone.  
                                                   
5 In accounting, constant marginal cost is arguably a more widely accepted assumption on cost behavior than increasing or 
decreasing marginal cost. For example, in product costing, the variable cost per unit is typically assumed to be constant within 
the relevant range of production. Zero fixed cost, though uncommon, is a justifiable assumption if accepting the procurement 
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Besides the variable µ that characterizes the buyer’s design quality level, the random yield loss 
also depends on the parameter δi, where 0 < δi ≤ 1. I refer to 1−δi as the quality-based scoring index of 
supplier i, or simply its quality level. For analytical convenience, assume δi’s are distinct. Without loss of 
generality, I suppose δ1 < δ2 < … <δn so that supplier 1 has the highest quality level, and other suppliers are 
ordered accordingly.  
Suppose the latent defect described above is the only sort of defects that could occur in the buyer’s 
or a supplier’s production process. Thus, the total quantity ordered by the buyer is always the same as the 
total quantity delivered by the suppliers. The buyer sells all Q units of finished product to end customers. 
Denote by D = 
n
i 1=
∑ Di the total amount of defective products sold. I assume that each customer with a 
defective product will experience a field failure and take the product back for warranty repair. Knowing 
that the product has a defective part, the buyer finds it in its best interest to replace the part by another 
based on the old design, which is expensive but infallible.  
Suppose that all warranty related costs, net of the salvage values of the replaced parts, are 
proportional to the amount of products returned for repair, i.e., ωD, where ω > 0. Moreover, the defective 
products will lead to customer dissatisfaction and eventually some additional external failure costs borne 
by the buyer. In particular, I suppose that such costs are primarily due to reputation damage. I argue that it 
is increasingly more likely to catch the attention of mass media as D grows, and the resulting reputation 
damage is increasingly more detrimental. This feature is captured by the analytically tractable assumption 
of a quadratic other external failure cost function: CE(D) = cED
2, where cE > 0.  
Summing up this and the warranty related costs gives the total external failure cost ωD + cED
2. 
Because the increasing marginal cost of CE is with respect to D, not its individual constituents Di’s, the 
quadratic functional form does not by itself favors multiple sourcing.6 To keep the model simple, the 
suppliers are assumed to have no external failure cost besides (possibly) sharing the buyer’s through a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
contract offer is an incremental production decision falling within the relevant range of production of a supplier.  
6 To see this, imagine the hypothetical case where the proportions of Di’s in D could be directly controlled by the buyer. 
Then it is clear that as long as the total, D, remained constant, there could not be any gain or loss from shifting among the Di’s. 
Even though Di’s actually are random variables, multiple sourcing cannot create any benefit unless the randomness of Di’s 
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contingent procurement contract. 
To see how the allocation of the production quotas to the suppliers may affect the external failure 
costs to the buyer, one can examine the expected value of ωD + cED
2 below (see the appendix for the 
derivation): 
E[ωD + cED
2] = ωµ[
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi] + cEµ
2[
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi]
2 + cEσ
2[
n
i 1=
∑ δi
2
Qi
2]. 
Interestingly, although the expected external failure cost is a second-order polynomial of Qi’s, sharing the 
production target Q among the suppliers cannot reduce the cost unless σ2 > 0. If instead the “random yield 
losses” Ri’s are deterministic, the third term in E[ωD + cED
2] would vanish. In that case, assigning all the Q 
to the supplier with the lowest δi would minimize the expected external failure costs.  
Summarized below is the event sequence of the model: 
1.  The buyer outsources the production of a component part of its product by offering each supplier a 
procurement contract (Qi, Ti).  
2.  Each supplier decides whether to accept the buyer’s offer. If supplier i rejects the offer, it will exit 
from the game and earn zero profit; if no supplier accepts the offer, the game terminates. 
3.  Suppliers who have accepted the buyer’s offers proceed to the production stage. Production costs, 
ciQi’s, are borne by the suppliers. 
4.  The contracted amounts of parts, Qi’s, are delivered to the buyer. Out of the amount Qi, Di = RiδiQi 
are defective parts. (The values of Di’s are not observable to any parties until later.) 
5.  The buyer uses the parts to manufacture the finished products and sells them to end customers.  
6.  Customers who purchased the D = 
n
i 1=
∑ Di units of defective products eventually experience field 
failures and return the products for warranty repair. The values of Di’s become known to the buyer 
and suppliers. The buyer incurs warranty related expenses of ωD and suffers reputation damage 
equivalent to a dollar cost of CE(D) = cED
2. 
7.  The buyer makes payments Ti’s to the suppliers. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
resulting from the supplier failure risk is diversifiable. This last point will become clear shortly below. 
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In principle, the procurement payment Ti to supplier i can be contingent on the amount of defective parts, 
Di, manufactured by the supplier. However, given that there is no asymmetric information in the model and 
the suppliers are risk-neutral, whether Ti can be contingent on Di is not crucial. For notational simplicity, I 
therefore do not make an explicit distinction between Ti and Ti(Di), with the former understood to be a 
random variable derived from Di. Consequently, any expectation taken on Ti is an expectation taken on the 
underlying Di upon which Ti may depend. 
3. Analysis of the Model 
Because this is a complete-information model, the buyer and suppliers are supposed to understand 
fully the model structure and have complete knowledge of all the parameters involved, e.g., the buyer’s 
design quality level characterized by µ. Let E[Ti|Qi] denote the expected value of the procurement payment 
to supplier i given that Qi is the assigned production quota. The buyer’s problem is to choose procurement 
contracts (Qi,Ti)’s to minimize the expected total cost below: 
n
i 1=
∑ E[Ti|Qi] + ωµ[
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi] + cEµ
2[
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi]
2 + cEσ
2[
n
i 1=
∑ δi
2
Qi
2]. 
If supplier i accepts the buyer’s offer, (Qi,Ti), its expected profit will be 
E[Ti|Qi] − ciQi. 
To induce participation, the contract must give a non-negative expected profit to the supplier, which means 
E[Ti|Qi] ≥ ciQi. In addition, the contract must specify production quotas that sum to the required 
procurement quantity, i.e., 
n
i 1=
∑ Qi = Q.  
The optimization program below summarizes the buyer’s sourcing problem: 
[SB]  Min
)( , ⋅
ii
TQ
 
n
i 1=
∑ E[Ti|Qi] + ωµ[
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi] + cEµ
2[
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi]
2 + cEσ
2[
n
i 1=
∑ δi
2
Qi
2] 
subject to 
PC:    E[Ti|Qi] ≥ ciQi  for all i = 1,…,n, 
QC:    
n
i 1=
∑ Qi = Q. 
Constraints PC and QC are referred to as the participation and quota constraints, respectively. Clearly, the 
participative constraint must be binding at optimum. This implies 
n
i 1=
∑ E[Ti|Qi] = 
n
i 1=
∑ ciQi. Substituting 
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this back to the buyer’s objective function, the optimization problem becomes one concerning the choice of 
production quotas Qi’s only. This choice indirectly determines the supply base B = { i∈N | Qi > 0 }, i.e., the 
set of suppliers selected by the buyer. Let b denote the size of the supply base, i.e., the number of selected 
suppliers. The type of a supply base, B, is said to be single sourcing if b = 1 and multiple sourcing if b ≥ 2. 
In particular, if b = 2, B is also said to be of the dual sourcing type. 
To simplify the expression of the buyer’s expected total cost, I define the following notations: 
η ≡ (µ/σ)2 
si ≡ (ci+ωµδi)/cEσ
2
 
The parameter η is the squared standardized mean of the “random yield loss” Ri, which means η
−1 is the 
squared coefficient of variation. The parameter si is a ratio representing the relative unimportance of the 
quadratic other external failure cost, characterized by cE, in constituting the buyer’s expected total cost. 
With these notations, the buyer’s expected total cost can be expressed as  
cEσ
2[
n
i 1=
∑ siQi + η(
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi)
2 + 
n
i 1=
∑ δi
2
Qi
2]. 
Whether multiple sourcing has advantages over single sourcing, or the other way around, depends 
on the optimal choice of Qi’s and the resulting size of B. The following result tells us when the protection 
advantage of multiple sourcing may fail to exist.  
PROPOSITION 1 (CONDITIONS FOR NON-EXISTENCE OF PROTECTION ADVANTAGE OF MULTIPLE 
SOURCING):  Suppose the ascending ranking of the suppliers based on si also has supplier 1 ranked 
highest. Or, alternatively, suppose that for any distinct j and k with (δk – δj)(sk – sj) ≤ 0,  
(sj – sk)/(δk – δj) < 2ηδ1Q. 
Then multiple sourcing has no advantage over single sourcing if one of the following holds: 
(a) The variance of the “random yield loss” is negligible, i.e., σ2 → 0; 
(b) The marginal other external failure cost is negligible, i.e., cE → 0. 
The result of this proposition needs one of two preconditions: either that both the si-based and δi-based 
rankings have supplier 1 ranked highest, or that whenever they differ in ranking suppliers j and k, the 
cardinal difference sj – sk, relative to δk – δj, is not too large. When one of these preconditions holds, the 
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reason for multiple sourcing to be advantageous comes solely from the protection against supplier failure 
risk due to latent defects. Multiple sourcing becomes unattractive if there is little risk to protect against, or 
the benefit (i.e., external failure cost saved) from the protection is tiny.  
Two model elements contributing to the protection advantage of multiple sourcing are highlighted 
by the proposition. The first is about the nature of the supplier failure risk. If the “risk” is not due to 
variation in the yield but merely about not knowing which unit is defective (e.g., the fully predictable 
yields assumed in Burke et al. 2007), there might not be room for risk diversification by multiple sourcing.  
The second element is related to the nature of the external failure costs considered here. With 
genuine random yields, the quadratic other external failure cost induces a desire for spreading the supplier 
failure risk by multiple sourcing. If the marginal other external failure cost is negligible, the buyer will 
remain “risk-neutral” to the risk. The protection advantage of multiple sourcing therefore cannot exist.  
Below I will characterize the unique optimal production quota allocation for the buyer’s sourcing 
problem, identify some intuitive features of the allocation, and derive necessary and sufficient conditions 
for determining the exact size of the optimal supply base and whether single or multiple sourcing is 
optimal. These results are stated in terms of the quality-adjusted cost-based scoring index defined as 
follows: 
.
)2(
)(
2
E
*
E*





 ++
≡
σ
µδµω
c
Wcc
WS
ii
i
 
It will be clear shortly that the µW* in the index is simply the expected number of external failures given 
the optimally allocated production quotas.  
If suppliers’ qualities are nearly identical (i.e., δi’s are almost the same), the ranking by Si(W
*) is 
not much different from that by ci. Alternatively, if production costs are equal, Si(W
*) and δ i give the same 
ranking. Even when the costs are unequal, the ranking by Si(W
*) and by δ i can still be the same, provided 
ci’s are “not too unequal.” Specifically, this means  
.)2(max 1E
1
1
},...,2{ µδµω
δδ
Qc
cc
ii
ii
ni
+≤





−
−
−
−
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In words, the condition requires that the cost saving from using a lower-quality supplier is not too attractive 
given the loss in quality. 
The first major result below characterizes the optimal quota allocation without imposing the 
condition of “not too unequal” costs. Subsequently, it is added to put more structure on the optimal quota 
allocation.   
PROPOSITION 2 (OPTIMAL QUOTA ALLOCATION):  A quantity vector Q* = (Qi
*)i∈N is the unique 
optimal quota allocation for the buyer’s sourcing problem if and only if for some θ* > 0, the following 
marginal conditions are satisfied:
  





 −
≥
2
**
*
2
)(
i
i
i
WS
Q
δ
θ
    for all i ∈ N 
with the equality holding for all i’s in the supply base B
* ≡ { i∈N | Qi
* > 0 }, where 


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 ++
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is a quality-adjusted cost-based scoring index and θ* and W* are given by the following formulas:   
(η−1+b*)[2Q+ *
B
∑ (sl/δl
2)] – [ *
B
∑ (1/δl)][ *
B
∑ (sl/δl)] 
θ
* =
(η−1+b*)[ *
B
∑ (1/δl
2)] – [ *
B
∑ (1/δl)]
2 
(1)
 
[ *
B
∑ (1/δl)][2Q+ *
B
∑ (sl/δl
2)] – [ *
B
∑ (1/δl
2)][ *
B
∑ (sl/δl)] 
W
* =
2η[ (η−1+b*)[ *
B
∑ (1/δl
2)] – [ *
B
∑ (1/δl)]
2 ] 
, (2)
 
with b
* ≡ |B*| denoting the size of the supply base, η ≡ (µ/σ)2 denoting the squared standardized mean of 
the “random yield loss” Ri, and si ≡ (ci+ωµδi)/cEσ
2
. Moreover, W
*
 = *
B
∑ δlQl
* = 
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi
*.  
This proposition provides a closed-form characterization of the unique optimal quota allocation 
Q
*. Once the supply base B* is determined, the optimal quota for a selected supplier i can be computed 
with the simple formula 





 −
=
2
**
*
2
)(
i
i
i
WS
Q
δ
θ
 
 13
whose key constituents, θ* and W*, are given by another two formulas specified in the proposition. 
Although the procedure is straightforward, determining the optimal combination of suppliers to constitute 
the supply base can be prohibitively complex. This is especially so when the number of available suppliers 
is large. In a different but related setting, Federgruen and Wang (2008) show that a similar combinatorial 
optimization problem of supplier selection is NP-complete. 
However, suppose that the ranking of the suppliers by the quality-adjusted cost-based scoring 
index Si(W
*) = [ci + (ω+2cEµW
*)µδi]/cEσ
2 is the same as that by δi. This would be the case if the differences 
among the costs ci’s are sufficiently small and the marginal other external failure cost cE, or the production 
target Q and hence W* = 
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi
*, is sufficiently large. Under such circumstances, the weight attached to 
the second component of Si(W
*) will be large enough to let δi dominate this scoring index. Consequently, 
the unique optimal quota allocation Q* will have some simple, intuitive properties.  
The first property is a positive relation between the quality of a selected supplier and the quota 
assigned to it. That is to say, the higher the quality of a supplier, the larger the quota assigned to it. As a 
result, the supplier selection is quality-driven: if a supplier is selected into the supply base, any suppliers of 
higher quality (i.e., with lower δi’s) will also be selected. These two intuitive properties are formally stated 
as the result below. 
PROPOSITION 3 (QUALITY-DRIVEN SUPPLY BASE AND LARGER QUOTAS FOR HIGHER-QUALITY 
SUPPLIERS):  Suppose max i∈{2,…,n} [(ci−1 − ci)/(δi − δi−1)] ≤ ωµ + 2δ1QcEµ
2. Then the supply base B* of 
the optimal quota allocation Q
* is quality-driven, i.e., B* = {1, 2, …, b*}. Additionally, higher-quality 
suppliers will be assigned larger quotas, i.e.,  Qj
* > Qj+1
* for all j ∈ B*\{b*}. 
Despite no fixed costs for selecting more suppliers, expanding the supply base can be costly 
because it means using suppliers of lower quality than the incumbent ones. The increase in this cost as 
lower-quality suppliers are included into the supply base eventually may limit its size. An interesting 
question to ask is when it will stop at the size of one (i.e., single sourcing is optimal) and when it will stop 
at a size larger than one (i.e., multiple sourcing is optimal). The following results shed some light on this 
question. 
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PROPOSITION 4 (SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITION FOR DETERMINING THE SIZE OF THE 
OPTIMAL SUPPLY BASE):  Suppose max i∈{2,…,n} [(ci−1 − ci)/(δi − δi−1)] ≤ ωµ + 2δ1QcEµ
2. Then the size of 
the (smallest) optimal supply base is j (i.e., b
* = j), where j ∈ N\{n}, if and only if there exist positive θj 
and Wj defined by formulas (1) and (2) with B
* substituted by Bj ≡ {1, …, j} such that     
[θj − Sj(Wj)]/2δj
2 > 0 ≥ [θj − Sj+1(Wj)]/2δj+1
2, 
where Si(W) ≡ [ci + (ω+2cEµW
*)µδi]/cEσ
2. If the condition above is not satisfied by any j < n, b* = n. 
This proposition provides a characterization of b*, the size of the optimal supply base. Determining 
b
* can be rather complex owing to the combinatorial nature of the supplier selection problem. However, if 
the precondition of the proposition holds, i.e., the differences between consecutive ci’s are “not too large,” 
then the problem of determining the size of the optimal supply base can be reduced to simply comparing 
the n quality-driven supply bases, i.e., Bj ≡ {1, …, j} for j ∈ N. This comparison only requires solving for 
each j a linear equation system with two unknowns, i.e., θj and Wj, and then search for the j with the lowest 
positive value of [θj − Sj(Wj)]/2δj
2. Such a problem takes much less time to solve than the original problem. 
 Suppose one only needs to determine whether single sourcing or multiple sourcing is optimal, 
without actually identifying the size of the optimal supply base for the latter case. Then the problem can be 
simplified even without a precondition. Why? Proposition 2 already provides the necessary and sufficient 
condition for checking whether any given supply base B is optimal. For the case of single sourcing, there 
are only n such candidate supply bases to check. If none of them is optimal, the optimal arrangement must 
be multiple sourcing. To check whether a singleton supply base is optimal, it does not require the 
remaining unselected suppliers to be lined up in certain orders. One only needs to ensure that the buyer 
cannot be better off by shifting some quota away from a candidate single-sourcing supplier. This result is 
the next proposition. 
PROPOSITION 5 (SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITION FOR SINGLE SOURCING TO BE 
OPTIMAL):  Let θ h ≡ sh + 2(1+η)Qδh
2 and W h ≡ δhQ for all h ∈ N. Then single sourcing is optimal if and 
only if there exists h ∈ N such that     
max i∈N\{h} [(θ
 h − Si(W
 h))/2δi
2] ≤ 0, 
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where Si(W) ≡ [ci + (ω+2cEµW
*)µδi]/cEσ
2 = si + 2ηWδi and si ≡ (ci+ωµδi)/cEσ
2. The h satisfying the 
condition above is the only selected supplier of the single-sourcing supply base.  
In the necessary and sufficient condition of this proposition, there is no counterpart of the [θj − 
Sj(Wj)]/2δj
2 > 0 required in Proposition 4. The reason is that such a requirement is automatically satisfied 
for the case of single sourcing. Using the definitions of θ h and W h, it is easy to verify that [θ h − 
Sh(W
 h)]/2δh
2 = Q > 0, regardless of the h ∈ N in concern. The requirement of 0 ≥ [θj − Sj+1(Wj)]/2δj+1
2 in 
Proposition 4 as well as its precondition max i∈{2,…,n} [(ci−1 − ci)/(δi − δi−1)] ≤ ωµ + 2δ1QcEµ
2 are  
substituted by the condition that max i∈N\{h} [(θ
 h − Si(W
 h))/2δi
2] ≤ 0 for some h. While this looks more 
complicated, it does not impose any ordering on the ci’s or restrictions on their differences. In terms of 
computational complexity, checking the condition requires calculating n−1 values of [(θ h − Si(W
 h))/2δi
2] 
for each h ∈ N. This amounts to a total of n(n−1) calculations, a more complicated task but still 
manageable within a reasonable time.  
4. Discussions: Importance of Quality Costs and Related Recent Studies  
Quality, in particular product safety, is an important factor to consider in supplier selection 
decisions. Supporting this view, 78% of the senior executives participating in a survey answered that 
product safety is among the greatest risks in relation to the integrity of their supply chains. In addition, 
68% of them cited quality as the main risk of global sourcing (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008). 
Recently, product safety concerns related to global sourcing have hit the headlines repeatedly. The 
most noticeable cases are recalls of unsafe products manufactured by suppliers in China (more details 
given in the appendix). For instance, Mattel recalled 436,000 Chinese-made toy cars covered with lead 
paint in 2007 (Story and Barboza 2007). Other recent recalls for unsafe products include a drug, namely 
heparin, and dairy products. In both cases, the products were tainted by contaminants structurally so 
similar to the real ingredients that they could not have been distinguished by routine tests. Such latent 
defects, like the use of lead paint, are flaws affecting voluminous amounts of products and yet 
unforeseeable or undiscoverable at the time of buying from the suppliers. By the time the flaws are noticed, 
the defective products have reached the hands of end customers, or may even have caused irreversible 
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damages. Quality costs to the buying companies of such defective products are no doubt an essential factor 
to consider in forming the supply base. 
Quality problems, however, are not exclusive to sourcing from low-cost countries like China. 
Alongside with the recall for lead-paint toys, Mattel also recalled 18.2 million magnetized toys made in 
China following Mattel’s design specification. In other words, any high-quality supplier would have made 
these unsafe toys designed by Mattel, the world’s largest toy company.  
Other well-known companies in the western world have also recalled defective products for safety 
reasons. For instance, in 2001 Bridgestone/Firestone recalled 6.5 million tires that seemed to have an 
unusually high risk of tread failures. Tires with this defect were linked to crashes killing over 250 people 
and causing more than 3,000 serious injuries. Many of the tires were installed on Ford Motor’s vehicles 
because Firestone is a long-term major supplier of Ford. To restore customer confidence, Ford later 
announced the replacement of about 13 million Firestone tires installed on Ford vehicles by non-Firestone 
brands. This move ended the nearly century-long buyer-supplier relationship between Ford and Firestone.  
Regardless of lower-cost suppliers in China or well-known western suppliers, latent defects may 
exist in their products. The quality costs to the buying companies are enormous. Mattel estimated that the 
cost of recalling 1.5 million toys coated with toxic levels of lead paint could amount $30 million (Barboza 
2007). Ford expected to spend $3 billion in a nine-month program to replace millions of Firestone tires 
causing customer safety concerns (Bradsher 2001, Hakim 2004). Besides the loss of sale and other quality 
costs that can be estimated, damage claims in defect liability lawsuits are difficult to assess.  
Despite the importance of the product safety issue arising from latent defects, models analyzing the 
protection advantage of multiple sourcing have concentrated on supplier failures due to unreliably supply. 
In this paper, I use a latent-defect model with non-linear external failure costs to capture the sort of supplier 
failure risk relevant to the product safety issues discussed above. To highlight the benefit from risk 
diversification as a reason for multiple sourcing, the model assumes away other reasons such as capacity 
constraints, cost information asymmetry, etc. Moreover, certainty in lead time and delivery is assumed to 
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avoid overlapping with prior studies’ emphases.7 To focus on the choice of single versus multiple 
sourcing, the model also abstracts away from other aspects of supply chain management already 
extensively studied in the literature, such as coordination for information sharing. (See Kouvelis, 
Chambers, and Wang 2006 for a review of the supply chain management literature and Cachon 2003 for a 
review specifically on supply chain coordination with incentive contracts.)  
I take the perspective of viewing the choice of single versus multiple sourcing as a supply base 
composition problem. The question asked is about what combination of suppliers can diversify the risk of 
latent defects most efficiently, in terms of the incremental quality cost to pay as a sacrifice. Instead of 
formulating a very general model that requires combinatorial mathematical techniques to solve, I structure 
the model in a tractable stylized fashion, yet rich enough to capture the fundamental economic tradeoff.8  
Recently, Federgruen and Yang (2008) has examined a general setting of the supplier selection 
problem that also emphasizes the optimal combination of suppliers. They show that this is an NP-complete 
combinatorial optimization problem. Their focus is to develop an accurate approximation method to 
overcome the computational complexity of the problem. Dada et al. (2007) and Federgruen and Yang 
(2009) have also considered similar general settings, with a focus on characterizing and solving the 
supplier selection problem with random yields and uncertain demand.  
In contrast, I consider a simple setting with no random yields nor uncertain demand but only latent 
defects. My analysis focuses on non-linear external failure costs leading to a desire for risk diversification. 
Complementing prior studies focusing on unreliable supply due to random yields, this model emphasizes 
the linkage between supplier selection and external failure costs. The model allows a closed-form 
                                                   
7 Reasons for favoring single or multiple sourcing that have been studied include supplier capacity constraints, saving in 
outgoing order/incoming inspection/transportation costs, saving in inventory holding costs by shortening the delivery lead time, 
quantity discounts due to production scale economies, saving in purchasing costs by supplier competition (with or without 
information asymmetry), and encouraging investment by suppliers to reduce production costs or to improve product quality. 
These reasons have been examined extensively in economic and operations research/management science (OR/MS) studies. 
Concise reviews of related OR/MS studies can be found in Berger and Zeng (2006) and Mishra and Tadikamalla (2006). A 
review of related studies in economics is provided in the appendix.  
8 Other studies in the quality cost reduction literature have focused on incentive contracting related to a variety of quality 
improvement arrangements like vender certification, incoming inspection, and product recall/warranty cost sharing (e.g., 
Balachandran and Radhakrishnan 2005, Hwang et al. 2006, Chao et al. 2009, Baiman et al. 2000, 2001). These models have only 
one supplier without considering multiple sourcing and supplier failure risk diversification. 
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characterization of the optimal quota allocation through which the fundamental economic driving forces 
can be clearly seen. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The model formulated in this paper is simple. Despite this, the fundamental economic intuition 
captured by the stylized model appears to be rather general and applicable to some other contexts. For 
example, an analogy can be drawn between suppliers in a supply base and stocks in a financial portfolio. It 
is difficult to form a fully diversified portfolio without degrading the mean return. One reason is that there 
is only a limited choice of high-quality stocks that may be included in a portfolio given the incompleteness 
of financial markets in reality. This tension between forming a diversified portfolio and maintaining its 
mean return is similar to the economic tradeoff highlighted in this paper concerning supply base 
composition.  
There are several interesting directions for extending the model here. A possible extension is the 
buyer’s endogenous choice of the total procurement quantity. Another extension is to incorporate the 
buyer’s quality improvement effort to raise the design quality level. A third extension might involve 
asymmetric information about suppliers’ quality levels and an analysis of the optimal procurement 
contracts and their relations with the optimal choices of quality improvement effort and total procurement 
quantity. Given the limited space here, these interesting extensions are left for future research. 
Quality cost concepts have been introduced into managerial accounting textbooks for some years 
(e.g., Horngren, Foster, and Datar 1994, Garrison, Noreen, and Brewer 2008). Although attempts have 
been made to investigate TQM and JIT operations (e.g., Wruck and Jensen 1994, Alles, Datar, and Lambert 
1995, Ittner and Larcker 1995, Cremer 1995, and Barron and Gjerde 1996), there remain a lot to explore in 
relation to quality costs. This paper represents another step towards this direction with regard to quality 
cost considerations in the supply base composition decision. 
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Appendix 
 
DERIVATION OF THE EXPECTED TOTAL EXTERNAL FAILURE COST: To derive E[ωD + cED
2], first 
note that E(D2) = var(D) + E(D)2. Hence,  
E[ωD + cED
2]  
= ωE[D] + cEE[D
2] 
= ωE[D] + cEE[D]
2 + cEvar[D] 
= ωE[
n
i 1=
∑ Di] + cE(E[
n
i 1=
∑ Di])
2 + cEvar[
n
i 1=
∑ Di]  
= ω
n
i 1=
∑ E[Di] + cE(
n
i 1=
∑ E[Di])
2 + cE
n
i 1=
∑ var[Di]  
= ω
n
i 1=
∑ µδiQi + cE[
n
i 1=
∑ µδiQi]
2 + cE
n
i 1=
∑ σ2(δiQi)
2 
= ωµ[
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi] + cEµ
2[
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi]
2 + cEσ
2[
n
i 1=
∑ δi
2
Qi
2]. 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 (CONDITIONS FOR NON-EXISTENCE OF PROTECTION ADVANTAGE OF 
MULTIPLE SOURCING): When one of the two conditions holds, i.e., either σ2 → 0 or cE → 0, the buyer’s 
expected total cost becomes cEµ
2[
n
i 1=
∑ ∆iQi + (
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi)
2] or simply 
n
i 1=
∑ (ci+ωµδi)Qi, where ∆i ≡ 
(ci+ωµδi)/cEµ
2. Suppose the ascending ranking of the suppliers based on ∆i’s also has supplier 1 ranked 
highest. Then obviously setting Q1 = Q minimizes 
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi as well as 
n
i 1=
∑ ∆iQi individually. 
Consequently, the expected total cost must also be minimized when Q1 = Q. Thus, multiple sourcing 
cannot be better than single sourcing. 
Alternatively, suppose that for any distinct j and k with (δk – δj)(sk – sj) ≤ 0, (sj – sk)/(δk – δj) < 
2ηδ1Q. Then if multiple sourcing is better than single sourcing, the supply base must not contain any j and 
n with the property above. Otherwise, assuming without loss of generality that δj < δk, I can rearrange the 
allocation by shifting some amount of Qk to Qj and thereby reducing the sum 
n
i 1=
∑ ∆iQi + (
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi)
2 in 
the expected total cost.  
To see this, simply differentiate the sum with respect to Qi to get the derivative ∆i + 2δi(
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi). 
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Note that si ≡ (ci+ωµδi)/cEσ
2 = η∆i. So for δj < δk, (sj–sk)/(δk–δj) < 2ηδ1Q implies (∆j–∆k) < 2(δk–δj)δ1Q < 
2(δk–δj)(
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi). Hence,  
∆j + 2δj(
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi) < ∆k + 2δk(
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi), 
implying that shifting some amount of Qk to Qj will reduce the expected total cost further. This leads to the 
conclusion that any multiple-sourcing supply base must include only suppliers with δi’s and si’s showing 
exactly the same ranking. 
 However, with such a ranking of the selected suppliers, the expected total cost can be minimized 
with Q assigned solely to the supplier ranked highest in the supply base, i.e., the one with the lowest 
baseline defect rate among the suppliers selected. This contradicts the initial supposition that multiple 
sourcing can be better than single sourcing if (sj – sk)/(δk – δj) < 2δ1Q for any distinct j and k with (δk – 
δj)(sk – sj) ≤ 0.   Q.E.D. 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 (OPTIMAL QUOTA ALLOCATION): The existence of an optimal quota 
allocation is guaranteed because any feasible allocation must be from the closed and bounded domain 
[0,Q]n and the objective function and constraints of the optimization problem are concave and linear, 
respectively. The following is the Lagrangian of program SB (with 
n
i 1=
∑ E[Ti|Qi] = 
n
i 1=
∑ ciQi substituted 
into the objective function and constraint QC decomposed into two inequality constraints):    
L = −cEσ
2[
n
i 1=
∑ siQi + η(
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi)
2 + 
n
i 1=
∑ δi
2
Qi
2] + 6θ(
n
i 1=
∑ Qi − Q) + _θ(Q −
n
i 1=
∑ Qi) 
with η ≡ (µ/σ)2 and si ≡ (ci+ωµδi)/cEσ
2. Since L is strictly concave in Q = (Qi)i∈N, a Q
* is the unique 
optimal quota allocation for the program if and only if the first-order conditions of the program are 
satisfied (see Takayama 1985, Chapter 1, Section D).  
Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to Qi yields the first-order partial derivative below: 
Li = 6θ − _θ − cEσ
2[si + 2ηδi(
n
h 1=
∑ δhQh) + 2δi
2
Qi]. 
The first-order conditions require that if Q* has some Qi
* > 0, then Q* has to satisfy the equation Li = 0 for 
some 6θ ≥ 0 and _θ ≥ 0. These 6θ and _θ must be the same for all such i’s with Qi
* > 0. In addition, if Q* has 
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some Qj
* = 0, then Q* has to satisfy the inequality Lj ≤ 0 for any such j’s for the same 6θ and _θ. Moreover, 
Q
* must satisfy constraint QC. 
As some Qi
* has to be positive, so must the difference 6θ − _θ. Define θ
* = (6θ − _θ)/cEσ
2. The first-
order conditions are equivalent to the following ones: 
n
i 1=
∑ Qi
* = Q   
and some θ* > 0 exists such that  
[MCi]:   θ
* ≤ si + 2ηδi(
n
h 1=
∑ δhQh
*) + 2δi
2
Qi
*     ∀ i ∈ N 
with the equality holding for all i ∈ B* ≡ { i∈N | Qi
* > 0 }. Another expression of the marginal condition 
MCi is as follows: 



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 −
≥
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2
)(
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i
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δ
θ
 
with Si(W
*) = [ci + (ω+2cEµW
*)µδi]/cEσ
2 and W* ≡ 
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi
* = *
B
∑ δlQl
*. 
To determine the values of θ* and W*, I divide MCi by 2δi and then sum over the equality marginal 
conditions, i.e., MCi’s ∀i∈B
*. This yields the following equation of θ* and W*:  
θ
* [(1/2) *
B
∑ (1/δl)] = [(1/2) *
B
∑ (sl/δl)]+ W
* [1 + ηb*], 
where b* ≡ |B*| is the size of the supply base. Similarly, divide MCi by 2δi
2 and sum over the equality 
marginal conditions. Then incorporate the quota constraint, QC. This gives a second equation of θ* and W*: 
θ
* [(1/2) *
B
∑ (1/δl
2)] = [Q + (1/2) *
B
∑ (sl/δl
2)] + W* [η *
B
∑ (1/δl)]. 
The solution of the two equations is as follows: 
(η−1+b*)[2Q+ *
B
∑ (sl/δl
2)] – [ *
B
∑ (1/δl)][ *
B
∑ (sl/δl)] 
θ
* = 
(η−1+b*)[ *
B
∑ (1/δl
2)] – [ *
B
∑ (1/δl)]
2 
 
[ *
B
∑ (1/δl)][2Q+ *
B
∑ (sl/δl
2)] – [ *
B
∑ (1/δl
2)][ *
B
∑ (sl/δl)] 
W
* = 
2η[ (η−1+b*)[ *
B
∑ (1/δl
2)] – [ *
B
∑ (1/δl)]
2 ] 
. 
 
In summary, the first-order conditions imply the conditions specified in this proposition. The reverse also 
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holds with 6θ set to cEσ
2
θ
* and _θ set to zero.   Q.E.D. 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 (QUALITY-DRIVEN SUPPLY BASE AND LARGER QUOTAS FOR HIGHER-
QUALITY SUPPLIERS):  For any multiple-sourcing supply base B*, let supplier j be a selected supplier 
other than the highest-quality supplier in the supply base. Suppose  
max i∈{2,…,n} [(ci−1 − ci)/(δi − δi−1)] ≤ ωµ + 2δ1QcEµ
2. 
Because W*  = *
B
∑ δlQl
* ≥ δ1Q,  
(cj−1 − cj)/(δj − δj−1) ≤ ωµ + 2δ1QcEµ
2 ≤ ωµ + 2W*cEµ
2. 
Hence, cj + (ωµ + 2W
*
cEµ
2)δj ≥ cj−1 + (ωµ + 2W
*
cEµ
2)δj−1, or equivalently, 
Sj(W
*) ≥ Sj−1(W
*),  
where Si(W
*) = [ci + (ω+2cEµW
*)µδi]/cEσ
2. By Proposition 2, 
Qj
* = [θ* − Sj(W
*)]/2δj
2 > 0 and 
Qj−1
* ≥ [θ* − Sj−1(W
*)]/2δj−1
2. 
Thus, Qj−1
* ≥ [θ* − Sj−1(W
*)]/2δj
2 ≥ [θ* − Sj(W
*)]/2δj
2 = Qj
* > 0. Since b* ≡ |B*|, it has to be that B* = {1, 
2, …, b*}.            Q.E.D. 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 (SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITION FOR DETERMINING THE SIZE 
OF THE OPTIMAL SUPPLY BASE):  Suppose max i∈{2,…,n} [(ci−1 − ci)/(δi − δi−1)] ≤ ωµ + 2δ1QcEµ
2. If the size 
of the optimal supply base is j ∈ N\{n}, Proposition 3 implies B* = {1, …, j}. Consequently, Proposition 2 
implies the existence of positive θ* and W*, as defined by formulas (1) and (2), such that  
Qj
* = [θ* − Sj(W
*)]/2δj
2 > 0 and 
0 = Qj+1
* ≥ [θ* − Sj+1(W
*)]/2δj+1
2. 
Define θj = θ
* and Wj = W
*. The condition of this proposition is thus satisfied. 
 For the “if” part, suppose there exist positive θj and Wj defined by formulas (1) and (2) with B
* 
substituted by Bj ≡ {1, …, j} such that [θj − Sj(Wj)]/2δj
2 > 0 ≥ [θj − Sj+1(Wj)]/2δj+1
2. Define θ* = θj and W
* = 
Wj. Then θ
* and W* by construction satisfy formulas (1) and (2) for B* = Bj. Moreover, define a quota 
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allocation Q* with Qi
* = [θ* − Si(W
*)]/2δi
2 for all i ≤ j and Qi
* = 0 for all i > j. Because max i∈{2,…,n} [(ci−1 − 
ci)/(δi − δi−1)] ≤ ωµ + 2δ1QcEµ
2, a procedure similar to the proof of Proposition 3 will show that Si+1(W
*) ≥ 
Si(W
*) for all i ∈ N\{n}. Consequently, [θ* − Sj(W
*)]/2δj
2 > 0 implies Qi
* = [θ* − Si(W
*)]/2δi
2 > 0 for all i ≤ 
j. Similarly, 0 ≥ [θ* − Sj+1(W
*)]/2δj+1
2 implies Qi
* = 0 ≥ [θ* − Si(W
*)]/2δi
2 for all i ≥ j +1. Thus, the marginal 
conditions in Proposition 2 are satisfied by the Q* defined above. This means it is the unique optimal 
allocation for the buyer’s sourcing problem, and Bj is the optimal supply base. Hence, b
* = j.  Q.E.D. 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5 (SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY CONDITION FOR SINGLE SOURCING TO 
BE OPTIMAL):  The “only if” part follows directly from Proposition 2. For the “if” part, it is 
straightforward to verify that for each h ∈ N, the θ h and W h defined in this proposition satisfy the formulas 
(1) and (2) of Proposition 2 for the single-sourcing supply base Bh ≡ {h}. Define for each h a quota 
allocation Qh with Q hh ≡ [θ
 h − Sh(W
 h)]/2δh
2 and Q hi ≡ 0 for all i ∈ N\{h}. Because θ
 h
 ≡ sh + 2(1+η)Qδh
2 
and W h ≡ δhQ, clearly Q
 h
h = Q > 0.  
To see if one or none of the Bh’s is the optimal supply base, it suffices to check whether one or 
none of them meets the remaining marginal conditions of Proposition 2, i.e., for any given h,  
Q
 h
i ≥ [(θ
 h − Si(W
 h))/2δi
2 for all i ∈ N\{h}.  
Some h will meet this last requirement if the condition of the proposition is fulfilled. When this is the case, 
the {h} is the optimal supply base and single sourcing is optimal.  Q.E.D. 
 
RECENT CASES OF MASSIVE PRODUCT RECALLS: The most noticeable cases are recalls of unsafe 
products manufactured by suppliers in China. These include  
(i) Toys. Mattel recalled 436,000 Chinese-made toy cars covered with lead paint in 2007 (Story 
and Barboza 2007). This incident raised concerns about the insufficient enforcement of existing laws 
banning lead paint. Such concerns forced other U.S. manufacturers to recall over a million toy ovens, 
trains, dolls, and other popular toys.  
According to Egan, Campbell, and Vogel (2009), “[t]he purported culprit was a Chinese supplier 
that had subcontracted its work to another Chinese company that had coated the toy cars with lead paint 
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without the knowledge of the U.S. manufacturer. … The foreseeability of these events by any U.S. 
manufacturer is doubtful. In China, as in the United States, lead paint is illegal. Nevertheless, it appears 
that a number of Chinese companies began using lead paint because it is more resistant to corrosion and 
dries faster, thereby, in part, decreasing production time.  
Until the 2007 toy recalls, the Chinese government was seemingly unaware that lead paint was 
widely used in its manufacturing sector, and therefore, did not sufficiently enforce lead paint prohibitions. 
Similarly the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission was also unable to enforce existing laws banning 
lead paint because it had only around 100 field investigators who were responsible for inspecting $22 
billion in toys.” For further details of this incident, see also Barboza (2007) and Lipton and Barboza 
(2007). 
(ii) Drugs. Heparin is a blood thinner widely used in surgery and dialysis. In early 2008, heparin 
sold by Baxter International was linked to at least 19 deaths and hundreds of allergic reactions in the U.S.. 
After recalling nine lots of the drug, problems continued. So the company suspended the manufacturing of 
the drug associated with the problems.  
Investigations later discovered that the heparin at issue, with its raw components bought from a 
Chinese plant, contained a contaminant mimicking heparin. By that time, Baxter had expanded the recall to 
cover almost all its heparin products. Because the company supplies about half the U.S.’s heparin, the 
production suspension and the widespread recall caused worries about shortage problems in the short and 
long runs. The impact was so huge that some even warned that “many more patients would be likely to 
experience significant blood loss during dialysis.” For further details of the incident, see Harris (2008a,b), 
Bogdanich (2008a,b), and Barboza (2008a). 
(iii) Dairy products. In July 2008, infant milk formula produced by Sanlu Group, the largest milk 
power maker in China for 15 years in a row, were found to contain a toxic industrial chemical called 
melamine. Follow-up investigations discovered the same problem in the products of 21 other companies. 
Melamine was added to milk to raise the protein count artificially and fool safety tests for protein content. 
The contamination caused at least six infants dying from kidney stones and other complications and 
sickened over 50,000 children.  
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Exports of food ingredients from China have been growing in recent years. Because milk powder 
is an ingredient to many dairy products, the milk scandal scared the international community. Tests showed 
that many products of international brands were also tainted by melamine, leading to worldwide recalls of 
contaminated products. Affected brands include Nabisco, Kraft Foods, Heinz, Mars, Cadbury, Lipton, and 
Nestles.  
The scope of the contamination later spread to eggs traced back to the use of melamine-tainted 
animal feed, even though the chemical had been banned as an animal feed additive since July 2007. In 
reacting to the scandal, over 25 countries banned imports of dairy and other affected food products from 
China. For further details of the scandal, see Barboza (2008b,c) and Fuller (2008). 
 
REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES IN ECONOMICS: Before giving a brief account of related economic 
studies, let me clarify some confusion on the usage of the term “multiple sourcing.” In management 
studies, multiple sourcing generally means split procurement arrangement, i.e., relying on two or more 
suppliers in procuring an item. The sourcing literature in economics, however, also uses multiple sourcing 
to mean sharable procurement arrangement, i.e., having two or more suppliers compete for a share in 
supplying an item without precluding the one-supplier-take-all outcome. The key difference is that multiple 
sourcing of the sharable sense (hereafter, sharable multiple sourcing) refers to an ex ante arrangement 
concerning the degree of supplier competition, i.e., at least two competitors, whereas multiple sourcing of 
the split sense (hereafter, split multiple sourcing) refers to an ex post arrangement concerning the outcome 
of supplier competition, i.e., at least two winners. In other words, sharable multiple sourcing can end up 
having only one selected supplier, as long as multiple suppliers have competed for being the one selected. 
Some studies (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1988, Riordan and Sappington 1989) claim to analyze multiple 
sourcing but are better described as studying source switching, i.e., about examining the effects of 
introducing additional suppliers to compete with an incumbent in one-supplier-take-all settings.9  
                                                   
9 More precisely, Laffont and Tirole (1988) uses the term “second sourcing,” which is a special case of multiple sourcing 
when there are only two suppliers. Second sourcing also has the connotation of finding a second supplier in addition to an 
incumbent, or to replace the incumbent when used in the source switching sense. Such usages are particularly suitable for 
describing the sourcing decision in a multiple-period or multiple-stage setting, as in Demski, Sappington, and Spiller (1987), 
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The sourcing literature in economics is largely based on auction models (e.g., Myerson 1981, 
Laffont and Tirole 1987). It typically concludes that split multiple sourcing is undesirable unless suppliers 
have increasing marginal costs with sufficiently low fixed costs (e.g., the third case studied by Dasgupta 
and Spulber 1989/90 and the second case analyzed by Auriol and Laffont 1992). As noted by McMillan 
(1990), “the disadvantage of multiple sourcing is that economies of scale may be forgone.” So for multiple 
sourcing to be better than single sourcing, scale diseconomies have to be sufficiently great.  
When suppliers have constant marginal costs with positive fixed costs (e.g., the first case analyzed 
by Auriol and Laffont 1992 and the settings studied by Demski, Sappington, and Spiller 1987 and Riordan 
1996), split multiple sourcing usually is undesirable because of duplication of fixed costs.10 However, it is 
always good to have more suppliers competing for a procurement contract as this increases the chance of 
finding a lower-cost supplier. This sampling effect makes sharable multiple sourcing desirable, regardless 
of the suppliers’ cost structure. 
Some studies have examined the effects of incomplete information about suppliers’ types on the 
dis/advantages of multiple sourcing and the sourcing decision. Auriol and Laffont (1992) find that the 
sampling effect is higher under incomplete information than under complete information, provided the 
consumer demand is sufficiently price-inelastic. If the consumer demand is sufficiently price-elastic, the 
contrary instead holds. Riordan (1996) studies a setting with an exogenous procurement quantity 
requirement, which resembles a price-inelastic demand. He finds that incomplete information biases the 
choice of the market structure in his model towards sharable multiple sourcing, a result consistent with 
Auriol and Laffont’s.  
By contrast, Dana and Spier (1994) draw a different conclusion about split multiple sourcing. 
Because the split-award outcome is a weaker penalty to a lying supplier than the no-award outcome (i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Laffont and Tirole (1988), and Riordan and Sappington (1989). In a single-period setting, dual sourcing seems to be a better term 
for describing the two-supplier case of multiple sourcing. 
10 Dana and Spier (1994) and McGuire and Riordan (1995) have studied settings with constant marginal costs and positive 
fixed costs yet still found a split-award outcome (i.e., the duopoly market structure in their models) sometimes desirable. Dana 
and Spier’s result is driven by smaller efficiency loss resulting from Cournot competition by the suppliers in the case of dual 
sourcing, as compared to unregulated monopoly in the case of single sourcing. McGuire and Riordan’s result is due to the spatial 
competition model embedded in their model: a product differentiation benefit, playing the same role as increasing marginal costs, 
arises when aggregating the social value of the treatment to clients uniformly distributed on a line of unit length. 
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single sourcing from a rival supplier), split multiple sourcing is less powerful in discouraging suppliers 
from lying about their types. Thus, it should be used less often under incomplete information than under 
complete information. McGuire and Riordan (1995) obtain a similar result for some parameter values of 
their model, and the contrary for some other values.  
The research discussed so far follows a normative approach to study the optimal sourcing decision. 
Some other research by contrast uses a positive approach to investigate when multiple sourcing can arise in 
equilibrium. Anton and Yao (1989) consider a setting with two suppliers playing a sharable procurement 
auction. Interestingly, the buyer is indifferent among all equilibria, which include single-sourcing from the 
lower-cost supplier. So although dual sourcing can arise in equilibrium, it brings no benefit to the buyer. 
Extending their model to include incomplete information, Anton and Yao (1992) show that dual sourcing 
can arise in equilibrium if a technical condition is fulfilled. This condition ensures that dual-source 
production is less expensive than sole-source production.  
Seshadri, Chatterjee, and Lilien (1991) study a procurement auction model with endogenous 
choice of participation. They point out that specifying in advance a greater number of winners to split the 
procurement contract may increase the chance of winning. This encourages more suppliers to send in bids 
and stimulates supplier competition. The downside of expanding the supply base is the higher production 
costs of the marginal winner, which are borne by the buyer.11 
From this review, it is clear that the sourcing literature in economics has focused only on the 
competition advantage of multiple sourcing, with no attention given to the protection advantage of multiple 
sourcing. Neither has this advantage received sufficient attention in OR/MS studies, as explained in the 
introduction.  
                                                   
11 Seshadri, Chatterjee, and Lilien’s approach has some normative favor. Although the winner selection and award splitting 
rules are exogenously specified, they discuss the implications of expanding the supply base as if it were a design instrument of 
the buyer. 
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Table 1: Notations 
N = {1, 2, …, n} is the index set of the n suppliers (n ≥ 2). 
Qi = the production quota specified in the procurement contract for supplier i (Qi ≥ 0). 
Ti ≥ 0 is the payment to supplier i for the component parts supplied according to the quota 
specified in the procurement contract.  
Q = n
i 1=
∑ Qi is the total procurement quantity (Q > 0). 
Q = (Qi)i∈N is the production quota allocation. 
ci = supplier i’s constant marginal cost of production. 
Di = RiδiQi is the amount of defective parts manufactured by supplier i.  
Ri ≥ 0, or more precisely Riδi, is referred to as the random yield loss of supplier i. The random 
variables Ri’s are independently and identically distributed with mean E(Ri) = µ, where 0 < µ  
≤ 6µ << 1, and variance var(Ri) = σ
2 > 0. 
η = (µ/σ)2 is the squared standardized mean of the “random yield loss” Ri, or equivalently, η
−1 is 
referred to as the squared coefficient of variation. 
δi > 0 is a parameter affecting the random yield loss of supplier i (δi ≤ 1). The value 1−δi is 
referred to as the quality-based scoring index of the supplier, or simply its quality level. It is 
assumed that δ1 < δ2 < … < δn. 
D = n
i 1=
∑ Di is the total amount of defective products sold to end customers by the buyer. It 
becomes observable after the customers have experienced field failures of the products and 
take them back for warranty repair. 
ω > 0 is the constant marginal cost of warranty repair. 
CE(D) = cED
2 is the other external failure cost (e.g., reputation damage) borne by the buyer, in addition 
to the warranty-related cost, as a result of the defective products sold to customers (where cE > 
0). 
si = (ci+ωµδi)/cEσ
2 is a ratio representing the relative unimportance of the quadratic other external 
failure cost, characterized by cE, in constituting the buyer’s expected total cost. 
Si(W
*) = [ci + (ω+2cEµW
*)µδi]/cEσ
2 = = si + 2ηW
*
δi is referred to as the quality-adjusted cost-based 
scoring index for supplier i, evaluated at W* = 
n
i 1=
∑ δiQi
* based on the optimal quota 
allocation Q* = (Qi
*)i∈N.  
B = { i∈N | Qi > 0 } is the set of selected suppliers constituting the supply base. 
b = |B| is the size of the supply base B. 
 
 
